This blog is for practicing attorneys defending against discovery motions. The blog is not intended to provide legal advice but rather, to collect and share theories and precedent that restrain civil discovery to reasonable limits.
Thursday, January 05, 2017
When a Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 30(b)(6) "Does Not Know" about a Topic
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
allow a party to disclaim knowledge in a Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 30(b)(6) deposition and,
later, offer testimony about that topic.
Courts have
ruled that because a Rule 30(b)(6) designee testifies on behalf of the entity,
the entity is not allowed to defeat a motion for summary judgment based on an
affidavit that conflicts with its Rule 30(b)(6) deposition or contains information that the Rule 30(b)(6) deponent professed not
to know
7-30 Moore's Federal Practice -
Civil § 30.25 (2016)(emphasis added)
Federal courts apply this principle to preclude evidence a corporate witness “did
not know”.
“[D]epending
on the nature and extent of the obfuscation, the testimony given by the
non-responsive deponent (e.g. "I don't know") may be deemed
"binding on the corporation" so as to prohibit it from offering
contrary evidence at trial.”
Wilson v. Lakner, 228 F.R.D.
524, 530 (D. Md. 2005) citing Rainey v. American Forest & Paper Ass'n, 26 F. Supp. 2d 82, 94-95 (D.D.C. 1998);
Courts impose this proscription
because theFed. R. Civ. Pro. 30(b)(6) deposition
is intended to ease the burden on corporations and, conversely, corporations
have an obligation to present well-prepared witnesses:
“By
commissioning the designee as the voice of the corporation, the Rule obligates
a corporate party "to prepare its designee to be able to give binding
answers" in its behalf. Unless it
can prove that the information was not known or was inaccessible, a corporation
cannot later proffer new or different allegations that could have been made at
the time of the 30(b)(6) deposition”
Id. at, 94 quoting Ierardi v. Lorillard, Inc.,
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11320, 1991 WL 158911, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13,
1991); United States v. Taylor,
166 F.R.D. 356, 361 (M.D.N.C. 1996)(emphasis added)
The Western District of North
Carolina excluded evidence on “the central issue” because the Fed. R. Civ. Pro.
30(b)(6) witness was unprepared.
“[Movant] could not first take the
position that it had no information on that subject and then later, after
the close of discovery and the filing of the Defendant's dispositive motion,
completely reverse itself”
Caraustar Indus. v. N. Ga. Converting,
Inc., No. 3:04CV187-H, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91829, at *21-22
(W.D.N.C. Dec. 19, 2006)
Bob focuses his practice on mass tort, product liability and complex commercial litigation. He frequently tries jury cases to verdict in state and federal courts around the country. He recently tried a product liability wrongful death case to a defense verdict for a major automobile manufacturer.Bob defends mass and class action defendants and has served as part of the national defense team for a consumer products retailer involved in formaldehyde-related class action litigation and a defendant in mass litigation involving tainted steroid injections.
Bob also maintains an active pro bono practice. In 2005, Bob founded a pro bono clinic in conjunction with the Virginia Hispanic Chamber of Commerce to serve the needs of Hispanic immigrants. The Virginia State Bar and the City of Richmond Bar Association have recognized Bob’s work with their highest pro bono awards.
Prior to entering private practice, Bob was a prosecutor for the U.S. Army in the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.